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Introduction
We investigate the consequences of horizontal mergers among …rms when the strategic variable is capital. Firms which most seemingly …t such a setting are workers'…rms: being owned and managed by workers, their concern about employment stability is likely to be stronger than in other types of …rms.
Actually, this is what the by now large empirical evidence seems to suggest. 1 Co-ops play a signi…cant economic role in their communities. A few facts listed in the website of the International Co-op Alliance su¢ ce to convey the dimension of the phenomenon. The co-operative movement brings together over one billion people around the world. Moreover, co-ops are signi…cant players in many national economies. In terms of employment, co-ops provide over a hundred million jobs over the planet (twenty per cent more than multinationals). Both in Italy and in France, they employ in 2005 nearly one million people; in Spain they provide about 250,000 overall jobs in 2012.
Almost the same number of employees worked in 2010 in the 5,450 British coops (10% of which were workers'cooperatives). In the US, thirty thousand coops provide more than one million jobs in 2006. The sectorial breakdown of co-ops varies very much across countries, although, unsurprisingly, the co-ops with more members operate in the consumer retail market, where members are the consumers. However, a glance to national …gures suggests that the co-operative presence is often signi…cant in the credit market, agriculture and food, housing and construction, health.
In recent years, we are witnessing a resurgence of interest in the cooperative experiences also because co-ops seem to perform better than conventional …rms during slums. 2 If we con…ne our attention to workers' co- 1 See, for instance, the updated and comprehensive survey by Perotin (2012) . 2 According to Cecop (the largest European association of national co-ops), co-ops are 2 operatives, 3 we may observe that the mutuality operating among co-ops helps them limit the number of bankruptcies as compared to conventional …rms in turmoil. Such help takes sometimes the strong form of merging: for instance, 30 mergers among Italian production co-ops occurred in 2009 against 47 in the all period 2005-2008.
The rough evidence reported in the next pages suggests that horizontal merging is a fairly frequent strategy undertaken by co-ops managers, especially in periods of poor macroeconomic performance. Notwithstanding the relevance and the frequency of such corporate strategies, to the best of our knowledge there is no formal attempt to model the consequences of horizontal mergers among co-ops. Our paper aims at …lling the gap through a simple analysis of an oligopoly formed by workers'co-ops.
Furthermore, we shall see that, since Ward (1958) , the standard objective function of a workers' co-op (revenue net of …xed cost divided by the number of members) coincides with pro…ts when labor is kept constant and capital is the only variable input, as originally pointed out by Sertel (1987) .
Hence, while we focus on horizontal mergers among workers'co-ops, our conclusions also extend to pro…t-maximising …rms constrained by a given level of employment. Our results can then participate in the long-lasting debate a¤ording the ongoing crisis better than non-co-ops, especially as far as employment is concerned. See Delbono and Reggiani (2013) for a descriptive statistics of some Italian industries and the references to other European recent experiences. 3 Workers' co-operatives are …rms owned and managed by their employees. This is a broad de…nition based on cooperative principles. In a workers' co-op the bulk of the capital is owned (individually or collectively) by employees; all of them are eligible for membership; a majority of the workers are members; each member has one vote. Again, see Perotin (2012) . Workers'co-ops are sometimes called 'production'co-ops or 'labor'coops, or labor-managed …rms, to stress the contribution of labor directly given by members.
on the merger paradox, according to which the merger is pro…table for the merging …rms only if they represent a large majority of the overall …rms in the industry. 4 We show that:
The horizontal merger is privately e¢ cient for any merger size. This holds for insiders and outsiders as well.
The horizontal merger is socially e¢ cient if market size is large enough, also in the extreme case of merging to monopoly.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Next section brie ‡y illustrates a sample of episodes of horizontal mergers as corporate strategies of workers'co-operatives in various countries. Section 3 presents the model. 5 For statistical details of this tide of mergers, see the report by Anthony Crooks, "Consolidation in the heartland", which is available online (www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/nov00/heart.htm), 6 To be precise, the examples coming from the dairy market and often from the agricultural market do not …t exactly the de…nition of workers'co-op, as members give products and not labor to the co-op they belong to. However, tehre is an obvious direct relationship between the labor employed by a member and the amount of product given by her to the co-op. duzione e Lavoro in 2011, and the one between two bigs of the sector (Unieco and Coopsette) in 2014.
To continue with other examples, we witness also a wave of mergers of agrifood cooperatives in Spain (see Meliá et al., 2010 ).
The model
We consider an industry formed by a …nite set N = 1; 2; 3:::; n of workers' co-ops. The demand side is summarised by the function
where Q = P n i=1 q i is aggregate output, q i is individual output, p is price and a is a positive parameter. Production takes place according to the following technology:
where l 2 is the constant number of workers/members in each …rm, and k i > 0 denotes the amount of capital installed in …rm i. We focus on 'pure' co-ops in which all workers are also members and conversely. 7 According to a well established tradition in the literature, we model …rm i's objective function as value added per worker/member:
We shall follow Sertel (1987) in keeping membership constant 8 (and, for simplicity, identical across …rms) so that the only variable input is capital;
k i is then the strategic variable in the non-cooperative game we are about to describe.
Although we are modelling a game in the space of capital amounts, this is equivalent to a standard Cournot-Nash game in output levels. To see this, note that (2) is invertible, and therefore it can be rewritten as
in such a way that the objective function (3) rewrites as:
Coming back to our formulation (3), the status quo ante is then the Nash equilibrium in the space of capital levels. The …rst order condition (FOC) of …rm i is:
Imposing the symmetry condition k j = k i = k on (6) and solving w.r.t. k, we get the expression of the Nash equilibrium level of capital:
where superscript N mnemonics for Nash equilibrium. 9 The resulting value 8 l may be decomposed as follows. If L is the number of workers (coinciding with the number of members) in a …rm and`is the number of hours worked per person in the same …rm, then l = L`: Since we take l as exogenously given, this is immaterial. 9 In correspondence of k N (n) ; the second order condition is always met as
added at equilibrium is:
and the associated equilibrium price is p N (n) = a (2 + l 2 ) 2 + l 2 (n + 1)
:
4 The horizontal merger: private incentives
We now consider a horizontal merger among m 2 [2; n 1] co-ops. Given the nature of a workers'co-op, it seems reasonable to assume that the membership of the …rm resulting from the merger is the sum of ex ante memberships of the merging …rms, with the adjustment taking place along the capital dimension only. 10 That is to say, the total number of workers/members in the new …rm resulting from the merger will be ml. As a result of the merger, we will observe n m + 1 independent …rms acting on the market. Hence, one has to compute the FOCs for the company resulting from the merger (labelled M ) and the n m outsiders, to be taken on the following objective functions, respectively:
Therefore, the relevant FOCs are: 10 Many empirical papers surveyed by Perotin (2012) con…rm that workers'co-ops tend to stabilise employment in the short-run reaction to shocks.
Now, imposing the symmetry condition k i = k j = k out across the population of outsiders (denoted by the subscript out), we can solve the above system of FOCs w.r.t. k M and k out :
From a straightforward comparison between k N out , k N M and k N (n), we can claim:
Remark 1 For any merger of size m 2 [2; n 1]: k N M < mk N (n) ; while k N out > k N (n); and k N M < k N out .
Hence, the post-merger capital adjustment operates in opposite directions for insiders and outsiders. While the former contract their capital w.r.t. the pre-merger Nash equilibrium, the latter expand it. As a result, the new company invests less than each of the n m outsiders.
Given the ex post distribution of memberships, we look now at the consequences in terms of equilibrium price and industry output: 
which is positive everywhere. Therefore, Q N M < Q N (n) : We may disentangle the driving forces behind the increase in price by looking at the consequences of merger on individual output levels:
The merging …rms contract their output w.r.t. the pre-merger levels (i.e., q N M < mq N (n)) while the opposite occurs to all outsiders (i.e., q N out > q N (n)).
The …nal e¤ect on price shows that the contraction in the output of the merging …rms outweighs the expansion on the part of the outsiders.
These e¤ects of the merger on output levels and price, in turn, are the consequence of the variations in the amounts of capital caused by the merger, as summarised in Remark 1 above.
We are now ready to tackle the key question of the private incentives to merge. The ex post level of value added per worker/member is:
[4 + l 4 m 2 (2 + n m) + 2l 2 (n + 1 + m (2m 1))] 2 (18) for the …rm generated by the merger, and
for any of the n m outsiders.
To establish the existence of a private incentive to carry out the merger, we need to compare V N M with V N (n). I¤ V N M > V N (n) ; any of the ml workers/members would vote in favour of the merger. We are about to show that this is always the case. Therefore, the merger always exerts a positive spillover on outsiders.
Welfare analysis
We now assess the welfare consequences of the horizontal merger. As is common practice in partial equilibrium analysis, social welfare is de…ned by the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In our setting, however, it would be inappropriate to identify producer surplus with pro…ts, as the ultimate goal of …rms is value added per worker. Hence, we use total revenue net of the industry amount of capital as a measure of producer surplus:
To understand why this is the appropriate measure of the surplus accruing to …rms, notice that we should multiply the level of the value added per worker/member by the total number of workers/members in the industry:
which yields precisely (22). As for the consumer surplus, de…ned as usual by the area below the demand function and above the market price, it is given
Then, in the pre-merger equilibrium, social welfare is SW N (n) = P S N (n) + CS N (n) = a 2 l 2 n [2 + l 2 (n + 2)] 2 [2 + l 2 (n + 1)] 2 (24)
The full expression of the post-merger social welfare is given by the sum of gross total revenue and consumer surplus minus total capital expenditure: which is always positive. Consequently, we envisage four possible (and mutually exclusive) scenarios:
i) The two solutions of SW (a) = 0 w.r.t. a are both negative. In this case, the merger is socially e¢ cient for all a > 0.
ii) SW (a) = 0 has no real solutions. In this case, the same conclusion as in case (i) applies.
iii) SW (a) = 0 has two real solutions of opposite sign, a < 0 < a + .
In this case, SW (a) > 0 for all a > a + . iv) SW (a) = 0 has two real solutions, both positive: 0 < a < a + .
Here, the merger is surely socially e¢ cient for all a > a + . 11 11 The overlong expressions of ( ) ; ( ) and ( ) ; as well as a are available upon request from the authors. 13 6 The pro…t-seeking industry So far, we have focussed on workers'co-operatives because the assumption of the stability in employment best …ts this type of …rms. However, the same behavior can originate also from a pro…t-seeking …rm subject to constraints on the number of employees. This might be the case with publicly-owned enterprises (e.g., several utilities in Europe) as well as with privately-owned …rms operating in strongly unionised industries.
It can be easily shown that, when the amount of labour is …xed, the maximisation of value added per worker amounts to maximising pro…ts. To see this, observe that since
and pro…ts are
where w is the unit wage; then
which in turn also implies that V i > w; otherwise the members of the cooperative would quit it to o¤er their labor elsewhere. Clearly, given l and w, the value of k i maximising i coincides with the level which maximises value added per worker/member. Consequently, the private and social incentives towards the merger are identical under the two …rms'maximands.
For our model applies to horizontal mergers among pro…t-seekers too, the foregoing analysis may shed some light also on the debate about the merger paradox mentioned in the introduction. In such a debate, the focus was on the consequences of a merger under di¤erent assumptions about the nature of returns in production, the latter being summarised by the properties of costs as a function of output. 12 A classical example emerging from such a debate involves the lack of a pro…t incentive to carry out a merger between two …rms out of three enterprises in the industry. An elementary exercise consisting in setting n = 3 and m = 2 in (20) su¢ ces to detect that in our setup such a merger is e¢ cient for the merging …rms irrespective of whether they aim at maximising pro…t or individual value added, as the incentive to merge reduces to
which is strictly positive, and therefore also N M (2) > N (3). The sign of (33) is clearly a straightforwad consequence of our Proposition 4. the lesson we may draw from (33) is that, if one models technology through a wellbehaved production function instead of a cost function, under the constraint of a constant employment level, the standard textbook example of the merger paradox does not hold anymore. 13 
E¢ ciency e¤ect and merger to monopoly
Through the initial assumption m 2 [2; n 1] ; we have ruled out, so far, the merger to monopoly. Yet, as the per-…rm (and therefore industry) employment is bound to be constant, the following can be easily established:
Proposition 7 There exists a market size e a above which the merger to monopoly is socially e¢ cient. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately e¢ cient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially e¢ cient if market size is large enough. Moreover, also merging to monopoly can be socially desirable. We have focussed on workers' cooperatives, but our results apply also to employment-constrained pro…t-seeking …rms.
It is worth noting that our model encompasses the frequently observed case of mixed oligopoly, e.g. industries in which pro…t-seeking …rms coexist with workers'co-ops. As long as they are both constrained on the employment side, although for di¤erent reasons, our results fully extend to such a mixed industry, and therefore the incentives to merge that we have outlined above would hold for a merger among pro…t-seekers and workers'co-ops. 
